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Abstract
Background: Reducing the Strength is an increasingly popular intervention in which local authorities ask retailers
to stop selling ‘super-strength’ beers and ciders. The intervention cannot affect alcohol availability, nor consumption,
unless retailers participate. In this paper, we ask whether and why retailers choose or refuse to self-impose restrictions
on alcohol sales in this way.
Methods: Mixed method assessment of retailers’ participation in Reducing the Strength in two London (UK) local
authorities. Compliance rates and the cheapest available unit of alcohol at each store were assessed. Qualitative
interviews with retailer managers and staff (n = 39) explored attitudes towards the intervention and perceptions of
its impacts.
Results: Shops selling super-strength across both areas fell from 78 to 25 (18 % of all off-licences). The median price of
the cheapest unit of alcohol available across all retailers increased from £0.29 to £0.33 and in shops that participated in
Reducing the Strength it rose from £0.33 to £0.43. The project received a mixed response from retailers. Retailers said
they participated to deter disruptive customers, reduce neighbourhood disruptions and to maintain a good
relationship with the local authority. Reducing the Strength participants and non-participants expressed concern about
its perceived financial impact due to customers shopping elsewhere for super-strength. Some felt that customers’
ability to circumvent the intervention would limit its effectiveness and that a larger scale compulsory approach would
be more effective.
Conclusions: Reducing the Strength can achieve high rates of voluntary compliance, reduce availability of super-strength
and raise the price of the cheapest available unit of alcohol in participating shops. Questions remain over the extent to
which voluntary interventions of this type can achieve wider social or health goals if non-participating shops attract
customers from those who participate.
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Background
In an effort to tackle the perceived negative impact of
super-strength alcohol in the United Kingdom (UK), a
number of local licensing authorities have encouraged
‘Reducing the Strength’ (RtS) schemes [1–4]. According to
guidance issued by the Local Government Association,
“the definition of high strength varies, but for the pur-
poses of Reducing the Strength schemes has tended to
refer to products from around 6.5 per cent ABV [alcohol-
by-volume] upwards” ([5] p.6). These products are usually
classified as strong beers and ciders sold at low prices.
Super-strength lager is often sold as single 500 ml cans
and well-known brands include Carlsberg’s Special Brew,
Tennent’s Super, Kestrel Super and Skol Super. White
cider is primarily sold in 500 ml cans, 1 litre or 3 litre
plastic bottles and most available brands are 7.5 % ABV.
Well-known brands include White Ace, Frosty Jacks and
White Star.
At the time of the intervention described in the paper
(2013–2014) a single 500 ml can of 9 % ABV beer con-
tained more than the maximum daily alcohol intake for
men (3–4 units) and women (2–3 units) recommended by
UK health guidance [6]. A single 3 litre bottle of white
cider also exceeded the recommended weekly alcohol
intake (21 and 14 units for men and women, respectively)
[6]. The UK Chief Medical Officer recently updated the
alcohol guidelines, recommending that men and women
consume no more than 14 units of alcohol per week,
spread over at least three drinking days [7]. Super-
strength products continue to be sold in quantities that
exceed these recommendations.
Alcohol consumed in large quantities for prolonged
periods is causally associated with both acute and long-
term health problems [8–10]. Wider societal problems
associated with super-strength alcohol include street
drinking and homelessness, anti-social behaviour, under-
age drinking and family breakdown [11]. There is no
evidence that super-strength alcohol has a unique or
‘special’ type of harm that would not be experienced
from consuming the same units of alcohol in another
form [12], rather it is the availability (convenience and
branding) and low unit cost of these drinks that raise
them as an issue of interest to public health practitioners
[13]. One Australian study demonstrates a positive asso-
ciation between high-strength beer and cask wine con-
sumption at a population level and alcohol-related
criminal activity and alcohol-related morbidity [14].
There is evidence linking the price of alcoholic beverages
and the volume consumed at a population level [15].
RtS schemes have become increasingly popular as a
method to address the negative impact of super-strength
products, and since 2012, approximately 80 schemes have
been launched across England [16]. The intervention was
originally launched in Ipswich, Suffolk, although Thames
Reach, a large homeless charity, has been campaigning
against super-strengths since 2005 [11]. RtS schemes vary
in nature with regards to the specific drinks or popula-
tions targeted, but in general, local authorities ask local
retailers licenced to sell alcohol for consumption off
premise (such shops are called ‘off-licences’) in specific
areas to voluntarily remove super-strength alcohol from
sale [5].
RtS speaks to both the physical and economic aspects
of availability [17]. If compliance is widespread, the
intervention removes an entire group of products from
an area, thereby reducing the quantity and variety of dif-
ferent types of alcohol available. Where super-strength
beers and ciders represent the cheapest products on sale,
the intervention will also raise the price of the cheapest
available unit of alcohol in participating shops. Due to
the relatively lower rate of alcohol levied on still ciders,
white cider is almost universally the cheapest unit of
alcohol available in shops. A study of heavy drinkers’
habits identified those who drank white cider as the
population group consuming the most alcohol [18]. An
organisation working with homeless and street drinkers
identified super-strength lager as a preferred drink, and
a cause of harm, amongst these groups [11].
Both UK and international health agencies recommend
increasing the cost of alcohol to address alcohol-related
harms, and evidence suggests that higher alcohol prices
will most affect those who drink at harmful levels [19–21].
Off-licences, primarily small independent retailers, as op-
posed to supermarkets, have been found to sell 95 % of all
alcohol consumed by heavy drinkers in Scotland. White
cider was found to be exclusively available at these outlets
[13]. Voluntary bans on super-strength products in
Portsmouth have reported high levels of shop compliance
with the intervention [5] and Ipswich, Suffolk has reported
a reduction in crime and anti-social behaviour [22], al-
though to date no robust evaluations have been published.
In this paper, we address the question of whether a
targeted, voluntary approach to reducing alcohol avail-
ability can achieve the prerequisite of successfully enlist-
ing retailers to volunteer. We also present early data on
the effect an RtS scheme may have on the cheapest
available alcohol. This is directly relevant to national and
international debates over the relative merits of volun-
tary and compulsory approaches for reducing alcohol
availability, as well as debates over local verses national
level interventions [23–25]. It also has parallels with
other interventions aimed at restricting particular alco-
hol products, such as restrictions on the sale of cask
wine in parts of Australia [26, 27].
In 2013–2014 RtS schemes were implemented in the
London Boroughs of Islington and Camden. In a related
paper (currently submitted) we explore responses to RtS
from the perspective of target populations of drinkers and
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front line staff who work with them. We have also con-
ducted a separate quantitative study of RtS’s impact on
alcohol sales using retail data (also currently submitted).
The aim of this study is to evaluate the Islington and
Camden schemes by assessing the effect on the cheapest
available unit of alcohol in off-licences and retailers' will-
ingness to participate. Using quantitative and qualitative
process data, it explores whether a voluntary reduction in
alcohol availability through this intervention is feasible,
what influences retailers’ choice to participate or not, and
how retailers believe their participation will influence alco-
hol purchasing amongst the targeted population.
Methods
As part of a mixed methods evaluation we present data
from local authority audits of off-licences and qualitative
findings from interviews with retailers. The evaluation was
conducted by members of Islington and Camden’s joint
public health team in collaboration with independently
funded researchers from London School of Hygiene &
Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). Local authority auditing pro-
cesses did not require ethical approval. The LSHTM team
obtained ethical approval through the London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Ethics Committee.
Intervention
In 2013–2014, voluntary RtS projects were introduced in
areas considered to have street drinking and alcohol-
related anti-social behaviour problems within two neigh-
bouring London local authorities, Islington and Camden.
The Islington and Camden intervention areas contained
63 and 78 off-licences, respectively. Each local authority
implemented RtS independently by recruiting alcohol
retailers to voluntarily remove super-strength beers and
ciders (defined as cheaply sold drinks with ≥6.5 ABV)
from sale in their shops with a view to reducing health
and social harms associated with street drinking, but also
recognising potential benefits to wider populations.
The projects were designed and implemented by licens-
ing teams in partnership with police and public health
practitioners. Repeated visits were made to local premises
to advocate for voluntary participation on grounds of social
responsibility. Letters and visits to off-licences by the
licensing and licensing police teams were used to raise the
profile of the scheme. In addition, in Camden a launch
event was organised by the council, which was attended by
public health, the business improvement district and the
local media.
Sampling
The local authorities held data on all local off-licences; all
stores in the intervention areas were included in the audit
to provide data on compliance with RtS. Shops known to
be selling super-strength alcohol pre-intervention were
included in the qualitative fieldwork. Stores were sampled
for qualitative fieldwork based on the assumption that
around 40 of the 78 stores selling super-strength would be
sufficient to provide a purposive sample that covered
different geographical areas, shop types and shops that
participated or declined to participate in RtS.
Sampled stores were visited to obtain consent to partici-
pate in the study from licence holders, managers or staff
(which we refer to collectively as ‘retailers’). Retailers that
did not participate in RtS were over-sampled to ensure
this group was well represented. Visits took place between
3 and 6 months after intervention implementation com-
menced. Two researchers conducted each visit from a
pool of five researchers. All interviewers were profes-
sionals with experience of conducing qualitative research.
Data collection
Data on sign-up and adherence was provided by local
licensing teams who made regular visits to off-licences
to record the prices of alcoholic beverages and to audit
whether ≥6.5 ABV beers and ciders were on sale. Where
possible, public health practitioners objectively assessed
the unit cost of alcohol in RtS participating shops. Pre-
intervention prices were obtained from shop managers
or shop staff and relied on their recall of the product
prices. The price, container size and brand of the cheap-
est beer, cider wine and spirits available in both individ-
ual and multi-buy deals was recorded on a pro-forma
during visit. Where a drink type was not available this
section was left blank. Where the cheapest unit of any
drink type was not clear, data on several cheap products
was collected for later calculation and comparison.
A topic guide was developed to enable interviews to ex-
plore retailers’ views on the scheme, reasons for (not) par-
ticipating in RtS, and views on how the scheme impacts
on purchasing amongst the target population as well as
broader impacts on the retailer and community. This
guide was developed in collaboration with the licensing
team who implemented the schemes and was designed to
elucidate the motivations for participation, as well as the
barriers. The guide provided a starting point for discussion
but there was also sufficient scope within the interview for
the participants to guide the discussion. The main themes
in the topic guide were: knowledge of RtS, rationale for
(non-) participation, impact on alcohol availability, chal-
lenges of participating in the scheme, impact on the shop,
response from super-strength drinkers, intervention sus-
tainability and suggestions to improve the intervention.
Participant responses were recorded in writing during the
interviews on a pro-forma with space for verbatim quotes.
To aid recruitment, interviews were conducted in the
shops as this was convenient for participants. However,
we did not regard shops as a suitable location to audio-
record the interviews due to the presence of customers.
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Due to the short time span between implementation
and evaluation no efforts were made to assess the wider
impact of the scheme on levels of drinking, health harms
or anti-social behaviour.
Analysis
The cheapest unit of alcohol available, regardless of drink
type, was calculated for each individual off-licence using
the price, container size and ABV data. The median
cheapest unit was then calculated across the entire inter-
vention area and this data was plotted in terms of median
and inter-quartile range pre- and post-RtS. A sub-analysis
was conducted on only those shops that participated in
RtS in order to understand the potential effect if the inter-
vention achieved universal sign-up.
Post-visit interview notes were written up and
reviewed by two researchers to draw out common
themes. These were reviewed by a third author and
through discussion amongst the research team, we drew
out the shopkeepers’ prevalent and divergent opinions
about RtS.
Results
Forty-three off-licences were approached for interview
and 39 (91 %) agreed to take part; 20 out of 24 Islington
shops and all 19 Camden shops approached participated
in the interviews. Nine interviews were from shops that
did not agree to participate in the RtS scheme. Interviews
were held with staff in managerial and sales positions as
Licencees or Designated Premise Supervisors were often
not available.
Impact on the availability of super-strength
Prior to the intervention, 74 % (n = 47) and 39 % (n = 31)
off-licences sold super-strength in Islington and Camden,
respectively (Table 1). During the 3-6 month period fol-
lowing the intervention launch, 33 % (n = 21) of off-
licences in Islington and 5 % (n = 4) of off-licences in
Camden continued to stock these products. There
remained variation within boroughs with sign-up tending
to cluster geographically. There was an observed positive
effect of neighbouring off-licences signing up and vice-
versa.
Impact on the affordability of alcohol
Price data was included for 33 of 39 shops visited. White
cider, where available, was found to be the cheapest unit
of alcohol available pre-intervention with prices as low as
£0.12 per unit. Super-strength lager was found to be more
expensive with the cheapest available unit across all shops
costing £0.22 in a multi-buy offer. In a minority of cases
the cheapest unit of alcohol identified was not classified as
super-strength. In particular, multi-buy offers of cider
with < 6.5 % ABV were found that provided the cheapest
available unit of alcohol. Despite this there was an overall
rise in the median price of the cheapest unit of alcohol
from £0.29 to £0.33 (Fig. 1) available across the entire
intervention area. The absolute cheapest available unit
rose only slightly due to non-participation of some shops
selling white cider. There was an increase in the cheapest
alcohol unit available in 17 of the 33 shops surveyed
(52 %). Of the shops that took part in RtS (n = 22), 85 %
saw an increase in the cheapest available unit and the me-
dian cheapest available unit across all participating shops
rose from £0.33 to £0.43.
Table 1 Availability of super-strength alcohol in the intervention
areas (Pre- and Post-RtS)
Number of
off-licences
in area
Super-strength
available
pre-intervention
Super-strength
available
post-interventiona
Relative
reductionb
Islington 63 47 (74 %) 21 (33 %) 41 %
Camden 78 31 (39 %) 4 (5 %) 34 %
Total 141 78 (55 %) 25 (18 %) 37 %
aVisits conducted between 3 and 6 months after initial retailer sign-up to
RtS scheme
bRelative reduction in the proportion of off-licences selling super-strength in
each area
Fig. 1 Cheapest available unit of alcohol in shops in the intervention
area (n = 33). Median, quartiles and range showing price of cheapest
unit of alcohol available in Islington and Camden off-licences before
and after participation in Reducing the Strength
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Views of shop managers and staff
Rationale for participation in RtS scheme
Overall, interviewees demonstrated a reasonable level of
understanding of the immediate aim of the projects – to
remove from sale cheap alcohol of ABV 6.5 % or above –
and the further aim of reducing street drinking. Addressing
health concerns associated with excessive alcohol con-
sumption was recognised to a lesser extent. Some partici-
pants identified closely with the aims of the project,
recognising street drinking as a problem in the area and at
times considering their own perceived responsibility in
enabling such activities:
A lot of anti-social behaviour to reduce it which affects
us…we had a lot of trouble and the neighbourhood
was not happy [Pilot participant, Camden]
Concern about the “neighbourhood” being unhappy
illustrates how retailers could see attempts to reduce
street drinking as a way of appeasing a wider customer
base of local residents. Other retailers hoped participa-
tion in RtS would reduce anti-social behaviour within
their own shops, linking street drinkers with problems
such as shoplifting, verbal abuse and at times physical
abuse of staff:
It seemed like a good thing to do. They [street
drinkers] were causing me problems… getting abusive
[Pilot participant, Islington]
More typically, reasons for joining RtS centred on a
desire to co-operate with the licensing authorities. Inter-
viewees mentioned wanting to “keep the council happy”
by participating. There were differences in under-
standing with regard to the voluntary nature of the
intervention, even though non-participating stores
continued to operate in their area. Some retailers de-
scribed a decision to participate taking the form of a
voluntary agreement to new licensing conditions
which would then be enforceable. Across the sample,
different perspectives of what constituted ‘voluntary’
emerged, with some believing that the intervention
was not voluntary:
We thought if we don’t do it, we’ll lose our
licence – this is our bread and butter
[Pilot participant, Islington]
Rationale for non-participation in RtS scheme
From the shops that had not participated in RtS, in-
terviewees consistently justified non-participation in
terms of perceived financial impact. These inter-
viewees explained that they were concerned not only
by the loss of trade from the removed super-strength
items, but also by additional items that some cus-
tomers buying these products also purchased:
At first, I thought, ‘why not?’ I like to be good with the
council [but] as a small business I have to look out for
my cost…. You realise that people don’t just buy one
thing, it’s a package… beer, cigarettes, paper, and so
you lose out on that money too [Non-participant,
Islington]
The voluntary nature of the approach – and the know-
ledge that other retailers in close proximity had not
signed up to the pilot – reinforced the view among these
interviewees that participation was not a financially
viable option within the difficult financial climate they
described operating within. The increase in the number
of local supermarkets and raising business rates and fees
were frequently referred to. These issues were com-
pounded by the prospect of competition from shops that
were not participating in RtS:
It’s not just about us doing it. If I sign up and
next door doesn’t they are just going to go there.
[Non-participant, Islington]
Interviewees described the need for an even playing
field, with super-strength products removed from sale
from all retailers – at a pan-London or national level –
before they could further consider participation in the
pilot. In particular, there was a perception that super-
markets had not been included within the pilot with in-
terviewees from smaller, independent shops citing their
participation as vital before they could consider signing
up themselves. However, these interviewees questioned
the likelihood that this degree of sign-up could be
achieved on a voluntary basis and reported that they
believed nothing short of a ban would be successful in
achieving this aim:
They should just ban the drinks … That way, they
wouldn’t go to other shops. Those who drink will
always find a way anyway. The only way to stop street
drinking is to ban alcohol. [Non-participant, Islington]
Interviews with non-participants in the scheme included
representatives from two national supermarkets. Despite
the fact that one of these stores had initially signed up to
the scheme, both reported that at an individual store level,
managers had little to no discretion over the product
lines stocked. The researchers were informed that in
order to remove super-strength beers and ciders, this
would need to be sanctioned by their respective head
offices and rolled out on a national basis. One inter-
viewee gave the rationale for this as the importance of
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consistency; that customers could walk into any store
around the country and be able to purchase a similar
range of items. The other offered a more multi-faceted
explanation, elaborating on the potentially damaging
impact that such a move could have on the relation-
ships with the major breweries, even though the man-
ager claimed that sales of super-strength were low:
It can be part of the deal with the breweries. So in
order for us to stock the standard Carlsberg lager we
have to carry Special Brew, even if we don’t sell much
of it. [Non-participant, Islington]
Perceived impacts since joining scheme
A few participants felt that there had been a reduction
in levels of street drinking, violence and litter in the area
surrounding their premises. They attributed this to anti-
social customers going elsewhere to shop for their
super-strength. Some described ambivalent feelings trad-
ing the benefits of reduced anti-social behaviour within
their shop against loss of sales:
In one way it’s good because you get more decent
customers but you also lose trade [Pilot participant,
Islington]
There was a widely held belief among interviewees
that the majority of customers were now going else-
where to buy super-strength beers and ciders. Inter-
viewees highlighted that the voluntary, and targeted
approach of the pilot meant that customers looking for
super-strength rarely had to walk more than a few
minutes before being able to purchase this: either to a
shop within the pilot area that had opted not to partici-
pate, or to one which falls just outside the boundaries of
that particular pilot area. Some independent shopkeepers
spoke of witnessing regular customers who consumed
super-strength switching to nearby rival independent
stores that were not participating in RtS:
We’ve lost business – we see people buying them
[super-strength beers and ciders] from other shops
[Pilot participant, Islington]
Other customers are going elsewhere. I see them. [Pilot
participant, Islington]
Some participants gave rough estimates of the percent-
age of their alcohol trade affected by RtS, ranging
from 5 – 20 %. In other cases, participants reported cus-
tomers substituting alcohol products, sometimes by steal-
ing more expensive drinks, but more typically by buying
lower ABV products. Shops tried to encourage this form
of substitution through promotion of lower ABV beers
and ciders:
We’re trying to push lower [ABV] beers and we’re
getting close to making up sales. [Pilot participant,
Islington]
Discussion
This study is one part of a multi-methods and multi-site
evaluation of RtS. It has been designed to produce early
evidence on the feasibility of an intervention that relies
on voluntary participation from shops. We found rela-
tively high rates of participation by off-licences in the
intervention areas and evidence that across the interven-
tion area the median price of the cheapest unit of alco-
hol available increased. The rise was relatively small,
although the target population of homeless and street
drinkers have few financial resources making them
susceptible to relatively small changes in economic avail-
ability [28]. The qualitative findings suggest that even a
relatively small minority of non-participating shops can
potentially deter voluntary compliance with the inter-
vention and undermine its impacts if customers find it
easy to access shops where they can still buy super-
strength products. The relatively small geographical
implementation area and voluntary nature of the inter-
vention make this substitution of shops viable. The
localised and voluntary nature of the intervention also
presents other challenges for implementers. For in-
stance, our findings suggest that larger retail chains
make decisions to participate at a regional or national
level, which means that local authorities wanting to im-
plement RtS may be obliged to negotiate with the head
offices of multiple national supermarket chains to ensure
their participation.
The fact that RtS is a local-level intervention, generally
delivered on a small scale, also has implications on the
kinds of research approaches that are feasible and useful
in this context. The local-level delivery means that the
number of shops involved and the drinking population
targeted were small, making sufficiently powered quanti-
tative analysis difficult. In this paper we have included
some basic quantitative data on shop uptake and mini-
mum prices but rely on qualitative findings based on a
purposive sample of half the total ‘population’ of off-
licences known to have sold super-strength prior to the
intervention.
The research also represents collaboration between
local practitioners and academic researchers intended to
maximise the utility of the study as a resource for
informing practice. One requirement to achieve this was
that the study provided timely findings about outcomes
that local practitioners could plausibly seek to influence,
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such as intervention uptake and compliance [29–31].
Lengthy academic timescales have been described in
previous literature as a barrier to evidence informed
decision making if findings are reported too late to affect
decisions driven by political timescales [32, 33].
It is recognised that public health researchers generally
value evaluations with robust study designs that include
greater numbers of participants to provide adequate
statistical power for measuring health outcomes, prefera-
bly compared with a suitable control group [34, 35]. We
too value such studies but we still argue the case for
evaluations that cater specifically for the more im-
mediate needs of decision-makers. Guidance on the
evaluation of complex interventions recommends such
studies to explore the feasibility of interventions and
help inform decisions about whether larger scale inter-
vention and evaluation are justified, so we would argue
that our approach conforms to accepted standards of
good evaluation practice [35].
Limitations
Within the timescales of the evaluation we are unable to
demonstrate any longer term outcomes such as reduced
crime, anti-social behaviour, acute health harms or im-
proved long-term health. Follow-up visits were not made
to all off-licences as part of the evaluation and sampling
was purposive rather than random. This research should
be viewed as a ‘snapshot’ over a relatively small period of
time rather than as the final and continuing result of the
intervention.
The interviews were conducted by local authority staff.
It is possible that this would influence the potential for
interviewer bias, if (for example) participants decided that
it was in their interests to emphasise their compliance and
enthusiasm for RtS. Non-participation was low but inter-
viewees were able to refuse for any reason they chose. We
do not rule this bias out but we do highlight that many
responses quoted in this article identified perceived prob-
lems with the intervention, and included some partici-
pants who described their refusal to participate in the
intervention.
The involvement of independently funded academic
researchers is intended to safeguard against the conflict of
interest inherent in a local authority evaluating its inter-
vention. However, whilst this form of ‘co-production of
evidence’ between practitioners and academics is currently
advocated amongst researchers, practitioners and grant
holding bodies, it raises questions about the extent to
which academic researchers involved can justifiably de-
scribe themselves as ‘independent’.
As many of the off-licences were small independent
shops, the only member of staff available for interview
was often serving customers at the same time the inter-
view was being conducted, which meant that interviews
were necessarily kept short. As a result, price data was
not collected for all shops. In addition, prices of super-
strength alcohol pre-intervention relied on the recall
and accurate reporting of the interview. We believe this
pragmatic approach helped to keep response rates high
but at the expense of a richer dataset. Interviews were
conducted in English, which shop staff could speak but
not always as a first language. In the absence of audio-
recoding, we are reliant on interviewers’ written fieldnotes.
Participants were not contacted to verify these notes.
Policy implications
Although voluntary and community initiatives are often
small scale and may have less impact than more com-
prehensive policy interventions, they are sometimes seen
as useful for tackling specific local problems particularly
in contexts where resources are limited [36]. Examples
of such interventions include the Alcohol Linking
Program [37], the Queensland Safety Action Project [38]
and the Swedish Stockholm Prevents Alcohol and Drug
Problems (STAD) initiative [39].
Reducing the Strength projects are a clear example of
an innovative local solution to a national problem and
over 80 local authorities have implemented RtS schemes
in the absence of a national minimal unit price (MUP).
Prior to the introduction of RtS, a litre of 7.5 % ABV
white cider retailed for around £1.50 in Islington and
Camden, which is 20p per unit of alcohol. In England
the 40p MUP proposed by the Coalition government in
2012 would have delivered a minimum price of £3.00
per litre of 7.5 ABV% beer or cider [40, 41]. An alterna-
tive alcohol pricing policy came into force in May 2014
banning the sale of alcohol below the total cost of duty
and VAT combined [42]. This effectively introduced a
MUP that varies by drink as duty differs substantially
between alcohol types. This established a minimum
price for one litre of 7.5 % ABV white cider of 48p or
6.4p per unit of alcohol [40, 43], a price far below the
current cost and even further below the proposed MUP
from 2012. The policy did have some effect on the
minimum price of a super-strength lager establishing a
minimum price of £1.30 per can [40, 43], higher than
the price in some Islington and Camden off-licences
during the research (pre-legislation). Research modelling
concluded that a 40p to 50p MUP would result in 40 to
50 times greater effect on consumption than the floor
price approach [40].
From the local authority’s perspective, persuading
retailers to voluntarily participate in RtS represents an
extremely resource intensive way of achieving outcomes
that could be potentially derived from a national MUP
policy. RtS focuses on the complete removal of a narrow
range of products, primarily super-strength beers and
white ciders, whereas a MUP would allow consumers to
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buy these products, but at a price linked to their alco-
holic content, and hence likely level of harm, rather than
their tax regime. In contrast, voluntary schemes such as
RtS are inherently susceptible to the problem that
retailers stand to potentially benefit by not complying if
they attract customers away from compliant shops.
The perceived merits and limitations of voluntary
alcohol interventions such as those involving alcohol
retailers have been widely debated in the academic lit-
erature and policy circles [36]. The research literature
on interventions to reduce population-level alcohol
harms provides evidence that mandatory rather than vol-
untary approaches are more likely to be effective [44].
Moodie et al. concluded in 2013 that despite common
reliance on industry self-regulation and public-private
partnerships in policy, there is no evidence of their
effectiveness [45]. Babor has argued that voluntary codes
are subject to under-interpretation, under-enforcement
and poor compliance [8]. A review of voluntary UK
social responsibility measures found poor compliance
and interventions that were judged to be not fit for
purpose [46]. A study of Australia’s voluntary labelling
scheme found the labels were difficult to understand and
did not have the desired health impact [47].
The alcohol industry has stated its interest in what is
sometimes called responsible retailing. Heineken, for ex-
ample delisted two high strength ciders, White Lightning
and Strongbow Black, in 2008 citing recognition of the
links between the product and social harms following a
visit to an AddAction project [48]. The UK’s Public
Health Responsibility Deal, a public-private partnership
where industry and government actors sign up to
pledges aimed at improving public health [49], included
a pledge to reduce the total alcohol in a single serving
carbonated drink (e.g. a can of lager or cider) to less
than the maximum recommended daily intake for an
adults. The manufacturers of some super-strength drinks
have signed up to this pledge [50]. In some cases, this
has resulted in a reduction of can sizes to 450 ml,
although the products have not been removed from sale.
Changes under this Responsibility Deal were evaluated
as being unlikely to contribute significantly to reductions
in alcohol consumption [49].
Our findings suggest that there is some support
amongst retailers for a more interventionist approach on
alcohol sales, echoing evidence from a previously pub-
lished cross-sectional survey of small retailers in Scotland,
which found support for another regulatory intervention,
MUP [51]. These findings provide a reminder that regula-
tion need not necessarily take place against the perceived
interests of the private sector (or parts of it, assuming the
private sector is heterogeneous), and it is possible that
some private sector stakeholders view regulation as a
fairer and economically less risky option than voluntary
participation in schemes like RtS. Our findings also sug-
gest that voluntary interventions can be perceived in dif-
ferent ways, with some shop keepers exercising their right
not to participate in RtS, others apparently supporting the
intervention, whilst others gave a more pragmatic view
that participation could help them maintain good relation-
ships with local authorities and so safeguard their business
against unspecified future actions from the licensing au-
thorities. Hence, we see that the conceptual boundaries
between voluntary and mandatory action begins to look
more fluid and subjective when viewed at close quarters
in relation to this intervention. We speculate that within
mandatory frameworks there may be points at which there
is a choice, and we suggest that within voluntary frame-
works the available choices may be weighted by under-
standings or perceptions of potential costs and benefits.
Conclusions
The RtS interventions studied here have led to the majority
of off-licences within the intervention areas removing
super-strength from their shelves. Retailers remain con-
vinced that customers often switch to non-participating
shops to continue to buy these products. This illustrates
the limitations of local, voluntary approaches to reducing
alcohol availability as part of harm prevention strategies,
even when the intervention is well delivered and achieves
high rates of compliance. Even some of the retailers who
refused to participate in RtS support compulsory measures
which, they believe, would help them avoid negative finan-
cial impacts.
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